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Abstract
Consider a public project which produces a consumption good
and which benefits future generations. Let a conventional cost-
benefit analysis find that it gives higher benefits than projects it
would dis-place in the private sector. Voters may nevertheless
oppose the public project: the combination of a desire to control
bequests and the lack of control over who gets benefits from a
public project makes the public project unattractive. In contrast,
private projects have owners, allowing parents to control whether
their children will receive the benefits from such projects. Parents
can therefore better influence the behavior of their children when
they have the option of giving the children title to private projects.
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A large literature discusses the discount rate government should use in evalu-
atingpublicprojects. Most analyses implicitly assumethatthe samediscount
rate can be used for projects that impose costs and generate bene…ts to the
current generation as for projects that impose costs on one generation but
give bene…ts to future generations. Programs with such delayed bene…ts are
increasingly important, particularly in environmental policy. Thus, reduc-
tions in carbon or CFC emissions impose costs on persons now alive, and
will bene…t people not yet born.
When capital and other markets are perfect, who will be alive when bene-
…ts appear is irrelevant. We shall show, instead, that generational di¤erences
do matter when considering public projects that yield bene…ts to a future
generation.
Our essential ideaisthata parentwhowants toinduceparticularbehavior
by a child may do so by conditioning a bequest on the child’s behavior, and
that such inducement is more e¤ective if the parent controls the assets than
if the parent spends some assets on a governmentally-controlled project.
Consider aparent evaluatinga tax increaseto funda government program
that would reduce carbon emissions. The program has no immediate e¤ects,
but will bene…t the next generation. Suppose that standard cost-bene…t
analysis, which compares the present discounted value of social costs and
bene…ts, calls for undertaking the program. Let consecutive generations,
say parent and child, implicitly bargain over how much services the child
provides the parent in exchange for a bequest. We shall showthat the parent
may oppose even a costless public investment that bene…ts the child. The
oppositionarisesbecause the bene…ts ofthe publicproject increasethe child’s
income, which is her threat point when bargaining with the parent, and so
reduces the parent’s utility after the bargaining.
The parent’s interest in her child’s behavior can be paternalistic. A
mother may want her daughter to avoid drug use, marry within the religion,
or complete a college degree. Or the motive may be sel…sh, with a mother
wanting her daughter to take care of the mother in her old age. Since the
literature has considered in depth the last motive, we shall mostly speak here
in terms of it.
2Thus, we largely follow Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985), Cox
and Rank (1992), Cremer, Kessler, and Pestieau (1992), and Cremer and
Pestieau (1991) in supposing that parents leave bequests to their children
because they want to obtain services (such as care) from their children. We
shall alsoconsiderlimited altruism, withthe mother demanding less attention
from her daughter, or leaving a larger bequest, than pure sel…shness would
dictate.
Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985) provide strong evidence for the
strategic bequest motive, …nding in particular that attention to parents
by children increases with bequeathable wealth, but decreases with non-
bequeathable wealth. A novel element of our analysis is to consider a public
project as generating non-bequeathable wealth.
Also consistent with the strategic bequest model, Borsch-Supan, et al.
(1992) …nd that children who earn higher wages spend less time with their
elderly parents. Laitner and Ohlsson (2001) study Sweden and the United
States, …nding that parental bequests increase with the parents’ lifetime re-
sources, and decline with the earnings potential of the heir. These results
are consistent with both an altruistic motive and a strategic bequest mo-
tive, but, the authors state, perhaps better …ts the strategic bequest motive.
Hochguertel and Ohlsson (2000), who examine pre-death gifts made by par-
ents, also reach conclusions consistent with the strategic bequest model: in
the United States a child is more likely to receive a gift if she works fewer
hours and has lower income than her brothers and sisters.
Some recent works, however, question the hypothesis: in the United
States children’s provision of care to parents is little guided by a strate-
gic bequest motive. (See Perozek (1998, who unlike Bernheim, Shleifer, and
Summers (1985) controls for the number of children in a family, and Sloan,
Picone, and Hoereger (1997) who study the amount of time children devote
to disabled elderly parents).
The strategic bequest motive appears far stronger outside the United
States. Horioka et al. (2000) compare the responses of survey respondents
in the United States and Japan. In one question, respondents were asked
whether no strategic considerations entered in bequests. In the United States
43 percent of respondents held the view “I want to make e¤orts to leave
behind a bequest regardless of whether my child or children look after me
3after I retire;" in Japan only 20 percent of respondents agreed with this non-
sel…sh view. In Japan 33 percent of repsondents said that “Most or all of
[the bequest] will be willed to the child or children who look after me;" only
two percent held this view in the United States.
Parents who make bequests for non-strategic reasons need not favor pri-
vate investment over public investment. But the evidence suggests that a
good number of parents view bequests, at least in part, as giving leverage
over their children; to understand the behavior of such parents we should
look at the di¤erence between private and public investments. The owner of
a private investment can control the conditions under which her heirs will
receive the proceeds from that investment. In particular, she can deny a be-
quest to a child who neglects her. In contrast, an individual cannot control
whobene…ts from a publicinvestment. The bene…ts may bea non-excludable
public good, so that all members of a future generation receive the bene…ts.
In other words, parents cannot use a public investment to purchase care from
children.
Similar results obtain under a somewhat di¤erent interpretation of why
children may care for their parents. Suppose credit markets are imperfect
and parents are uncertain about their future …nancial needs, so that they do
not always consume all assets during their lives. Suppose further that the
value of the asset, say a house, is greater if well-maintained. Then children
may visit their parents, paint the house, call the plumber, and so on, withthe
sel…sh intent of increasing the asset they will inherit. The child, therefore,
does not worry that a parent formally changes the bequest speci…ed in a
will, but provides services for the parent as a by-product of preserving the
parents’ assets.1
2 Assumptions
For simplicity we consider asexual reproduction—eachmother has onedaugh-
ter; neither sonsnor fathers areconsidered. Each personlives for two periods.
In period 1 she serves her mother. In period 2 she enjoys services provided
1This asset-preservation motive may explain why, as Sloan, Picone, and Hoerger(1997)
…nd, the informal care children provide their parents does not vary with the cognitive
awareness of the parents.
4by her daughter. Payment for the services comes from an inheritance. We
shall …rst consider purely sel…sh individuals, and then extend the model to
consider altruistic individuals.
Consider a person born in year t. In period 1 of her life she provides
services to her mother in the amount zt
1. In period 2 she receives services
from her daughter in the amount zt
2, which equals z
t+1
1 . The utility function








1 < 0 and @Ut=@zt
2 > 0. The notation Ut clari…es the identity
of the person under discussion. We assume, however, that all persons, in all
generations, have the same utility function.
A mother enjoys services from her daughter, but buys no services on the
market. Market purchases may be ruled out because the daughter can better
care for her mother than can anyone else. Or the child can give a speci…ed
quality of care at lower cost than can anyone else. Because of such e¢ciency
gains, a sel…sh mother would not want to hire a nurse for care, but would
instead want to induce her daughter to provide care.
3 The basic model
The basic model ignores consumption, saving, and investment. A person
born in year t inherits a bequest of B in year t+1. She can use this bequest
to buy services from her daughter in year t+ 1.
Consider a steady-state solution with each person providing services z¤
to her mother and receiving services z¤ from her own daughter. Figure 1
measures z1 along the horizontal axis and z2 along the vertical axis. Since z1
is a bad and z2 is a good, the indi¤erence curves slope upward. The usual
assumptions ofdecreasingmarginal utility of services received, andincreasing
marginal disutility of e¤ort provided, mean that the indi¤erence curves are
strictly convex (steeper as we move to the right).
In Figure 1 the indi¤erence curve through the origin is ‡atter than the
45o line. Alternatively, the slope of the indi¤erence curve through the origin
can exceed 1; that is, individuals can demand large services when they are
old in return for providing services when they are young.
5Clearly, one possible value of z¤ is 0; both the mother’s bequests and
services from the daughter are zero. This is the only possible equilibrium
when the indi¤erence curve through the origin is steeper than the 45o line.
This equilibrium alsodetermines thereservationutility U(0;0), relevantwhen
considering possible equilibria with positive bequests and services.
Figure 1 shows a di¤erent solution, where z¤ is determined by the inter-
section of the 45o line through the origin with the indi¤erence curve through
the origin. The intersection lies at point X on indi¤erence curve UX; each
daughter provides zX
1 in services and receives that amount when she is old.
This point represents a possible steady-state equilibrium, wherea typical per-
son’s utility is the same as the reservation utility: trade between a mother
and her daughter yields no net bene…t.
A third, and more e¢cient, steady state is also possible. This is repre-
sented by the point on the 45o line through the origin that is tangent to an
indi¤erence curve, shown as Y on indi¤erence curve UY. This point repre-
sents a higher utility than obtains at points X and 0. This e¢cient solution,
however, may be inconsistent with utility maximization by each individual.
Which equilibrium—at 0, X or Y —will appear depends, among other
things, on the relative negotiating power of a mother and her daughter and
also on their altruism. Negotiating power, or the ability to extract the con-
sumer surplus generated by the trade between a mother and her daughter,
can depend on the order in which a mother and her daughter make their
decisions, and on the opportunities for shirking.2 One possible assumption
is that the mother gets all the surplus or bene…ts. That is, the mother gives
the bequest B only if the daughter devotes such e¤ort to services that makes
the daughter indi¤erent about providing the service.
Suppose next that the mother is not sel…sh, but instead also cares for
her daughter’s utility. One way to allow for this is to suppose that the
mother wants her daughter to enjoy a minimum level of utility, say uM,
which exceeds uX. Such an indi¤erence curve is shown in Figure 1. The
steady-state solution would then be at point M, where the indi¤erence curve
intersects the 45o line.
2These considerations are related to work on the Good Samaritan Paradox (see Bruce
and Waldman (1990) and Lindbeck and Weibull (1988)). That literature assumes that the
recipient shirks and thereby makes herself poorer.
6We must yet check, however, that in such a steady-state solution no
mother would demand greater services in return for the bequest. Thus, sup-
pose that a mother had provided zM
1 in services to her own mother. She
could demand more than zM
1 in services from her daughter, and enjoy higher
utility. But this would reduce her daughter’s utility, and because of altruism,
the mother would not want to demand higher services. And she might not
want to demand lower services, because she is not fully atlruistic.
Our analysis so far determined possible equilibrium values of z. But a
given equilibrium can arise for di¤erent values of B; that is, the size of the
bequest was irrelevant. The following section extends the model by consider-
ing an alternative use of assets a mother holds—consumption. A model with
consumption is more realistic and also generates a unique equilibrium value
for the bequest.
4 Bequests with consumption
Let each individual get utility from consuming a conventional good, x, when
young. In addition, an individual whenoldgets utility from services provided











A person born in year t gets a bequest B in year t+ 1. She consumes x
units of it in year t + 1, and invests B ¡ x. In one period this investment
grows to (B ¡ x)(1 + r), where r is the market interest rate; she bequeaths
this amount to her daughter.
Let the steady-state value of care or services be z¤. Steady-state levels
of B and x, B¤ and x¤, must satisfy (B¤ ¡ x¤)(1 + r) = B¤, so that x¤ =
rB¤=(1+ r).
To characterize an equilibrium, note that maximizing utility requires a
person’s marginal utility from increased consumption to equal her marginal
disutility from decreased services from her daughter, induced by the smaller
bequest.
Consider a mother who increases her consumption by ¢. The increased
7consumption directly increases her utility by
(@Ut=@x)(¢): (3)
Her daughter’s bequest is reduced by ¢(1+ r). Therefore (by the envelope
theorem) the daughter’s utility declines by ¢(1+ r)(@Ut+1=@x).
To maintainthe daughter at the reservationutility level, the mother must
reduce demand for services by












Equating (3) to (5) gives the condition
@z2
@z1
= 1 +r: (6)
We …nd, as we found inSection 3 above whichconsidered no consumption
good, that one possible equilibrium has bequests, services and consumption
all equal zero: (z¤;z¤;x¤) = (0;0;0). Another possible equilibrium has posi-
tive bequests, services and consumption, but with no net gain as compared




¤=(1+ r)) = U(0;0;0): (7)
When individuals are altruistic, the steady-state could have utility exceed
U(0;0;0). As in our earlier discussion, in asteady-state each generationcould
enjoy the bundle zM
1 ;zM
2 ;cM
2 . Note also that in the absence of altruism, our
model would predict that a mother would want her daughter to have a low
opportunity cost of serving her mother, suggesting that parents may prefer
that their children be uneducated. But if a mother shows some altruism,
then she may favor education for her daughter, but not such a high level
that her daughter would spend no time with her mother.
Lastly, analogously to point Y in Figure 1, another solution to consider
is the one maximizing steady-state utility. But that need not result from
individual maximizing behavior, even when individuals are altruistic.
8We shall later want to compare discount rates used in evaluating public
and private projects. For that purpose, we observe that a mother would be
willing to pay ¢=(1 + r)2 for an investment that will return ¢ two periods
in the future. That is, the usual rules for discounting apply for changed
endowments (induced by bequests) across generations. To see this, consider
a mother who bequeaths an investment. Then the asset allows the daughter
to reduce her own direct bequest to the granddaughter by ¢=(1+r). In turn,
themothercanreduceher direct bequest toher daughter by ¢=(1+r)2, which
proves our claim.
5 Public investment that yields a consump-
tion good
We now extend the utility function of the previous section to allow for the













1 > 0. The output of the public project is a consumption good,
which is an imperfect substitute for the private consumption good x. We
also assume that the daughter can only enjoy, but not bequeath, the output
of the public project; the output lasts only for one period.
One might think that voters would always favor a public investment with
a higher rate of return than the private investment it displaces. The conclu-
sion is false, because individuals cannot fully control the allocation of goods
provided by public projects. More concretely, and in terms of our model, a
daughter who anticipates receiving much services from the public sector has
a higher reservation utility, and is therefore willing to pay less in services to
obtain a bequest from her mother with which she could purchase a private
good. Or put di¤erently, a mother can use a private good to buy services
from her daughter, but cannot use a public good for that purpose.3 When
3Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985) make related points. They note the absence
of Ricardian equivalence when bequests are made to purchase services. They also note
that social security bene…ts parents less than private bequests do. A similar distinction
appears in our examination of public projects.
9a public project yields a consumption good, rational voters may therefore
support lower public investment than called for by a …rst-best solution. Of
course, our result does not mean that voters will oppose all public projects,
but instead implies that at the margin the strategic bequest motive may
make a voter prefer a private investment over a somewhat more productive
public project.4
To highlight the point, consider a public project with zero monetary
costs for the current generation,5 that generates output ¢ next period. This
marginal public project leaves the mother’s endowment unchanged, but in-
creases her daughter’s endowment by ¢. We shall consider a steady state
without this public investment, and show that a person’s utility may decline
if government adopts a one-time public project that would bene…t her daugh-
ter. An alternative analysis can show that a steady state with public projects
need not be an equilibrium: a mother in year t can increase her utility by
voting against the project which bene…ts her daughter. The two analyses dif-
fer only in that one evaluates the mother’s utility with no endowment from
the public project, and the other evaluates the mother’s utility starting from
a point with the public endowment.
Let the steady-state solution with no public project have z1 = z2 = z¤.
A person can vote in year t for a public project that gives her daughter in
year t+1 an endowment of ¢.
The maximum utility of the mother is determined by the condition that
her daughter is indi¤erent between (a) caring for her mother and receiving a




¤;rB=(1+ r)+ ¢) = U(0;0;¢): (9)
The question is whether z
t+1
1 ´ zt
2 which satis…es this equation exceeds
z¤. When zt+1







4Our result corresponds to Kotliko¤ and Rosenthal’s (1993) conclusion that the gov-
ernment in each generation may underprovide a durable public good. They consider how
public investment may change asset values; they do not, however, consider the intergen-
erational transfers and services we do.
5The project may require spending this period. It may, however, be …nanced by borrow-
ing from abroad in the current period, with repayment in the following period made from
proceeds of the investment. This investment is thus costless to the current generation.
10When this inequality holds, a sel…sh mother can increase her utility by
demanding increased services, zt+1
1 , from her daughter who received ¢ in
public bene…ts. When the inequality is reversed the mother su¤ers from the
costless public investment.
Either condition may hold. Let care improve health. Private goods may
be complements to good health: money is worth little to a person so ill
she cannot enjoy it. In that case @U(z¤;z¤;rB¤=(1 + r))=@x can exceed
@U(0;0;0)=@x. Parents would bene…t from the increased endowment that a
public investment gives their children. But asick personmay plausibly have a
highmarginal utility of income. The inequality in (10) would be reversed: an
increased endowment to childrenreduces the utility of the current generation
of parents.
We summarize with
Proposition 1 A mother’s utility may decline with her daughter’s endow-
ment.
The result has implications for the intertemporal discount rate to use in
evaluating public projects. Consider an extension of our model which has
a person live for four periods. In the …rst two periods she is a child; in
the last two periods she is a mother. A person saves in the …rst period of
motherhood to increase consumptionin the second period. Consider a public
investmentmadeinthe …rstperiodofmotherhoodwhichgenerates areturnin
the second period of motherhood. A utility-maximizing mother would favor
such a project if the rate of return exceeds that on a private investment.
In contrast, we saw that even a costless public investment which generates
returns after a person’s death may reduce that person’s utility. (Of course,
the gain may also be positive but small.) A rational person would therefore
use di¤erent discount rates in evaluating a public project with returns during
her lifetime and in evaluating a private project with returns after she dies.6
The rational bias against public projects is inconsistent with standard
results showing that government should always accept projects with a rate of
returnhigher thanthemarketrate. Instead, intheir notablework, Arrowand
6Glazer (1990) examines the e¤ects of public investments on the equilibrium interest
rate. He shows that this e¤ect can make voters want government to use a discount rate
di¤erent from the private rate of return.
11Lind (1970) argue that government should use a discount rate lower than the
market rate. Others claim that government uses inappropriately low discount
rates because of the in‡uence of special interest groups, or because legislators
view construction costs as bene…ts to their constituents (Weingast, Shepsle,
and Johnsen (1981)). Yet our result is consistent with evidence showing that
the rate of return from investment in public infrastructure exceeds the return
from private capital (see Aschauer (1989)).
Were the mother concerned only about her daughter’s welfare, and were
all individuals in all generations identical, then of course the mother would
want to maximize her daughter’s bequest, and so the mother would favor
e¢cient public investments. And were the daughter altruistic towards her
mother, say by wanting to assure herself a reservation level of utility, but
otherwise devoting her e¤orts to her mother, then once again voters would
favor e¢cient public investments.
But even with altruism in most (but not all) generations, a bias may ap-
pear against public investment. Suppose that in some generation a mother
fears that with some probability her daughter will need much services from
her granddaughter, more than her granddaughter would provide in the ab-
sence of an implicit payment through a bequest. Then the mother will want
to leave a large private bequest so that her daughter could induce services
from her own daughter.
6 Public investment in infrastructure
Consider next a public investment that does not directly produce a consump-
tion good. Instead, the public investment, say in infrastructure, increases the
rate of return on private investment. An individual’s inability to control how
the output from a public project is allocated then creates no problem be-
cause each parent still controls the bene…ts of the public project, that is the
increased output of the private investments.
We again analyze the issues by supposing that the investment is free.
Consider …rst a public investment in year t + 1 that increases the rate of
return earned on the mother’s investment in year t + 1, which becomes her
daughter’s bequest in year t + 2. The mother necessarily gains from this
public project. To see this, suppose that the rate of return increases from
12r to r + ±. A mother who wants to give the same bequest can increase her
consumption of the private good by dx ´ B=(1 + r + ±) ¡ B=(1 + r). The
mother’s utility increases by [@U=@x]dx.
More interesting is a public investment made inyear t that raises the rate
of return on an investment made in year t+1. Would a mother bene…t from
an increase in the rate of return earned on the bequest made by her daughter
to her granddaughter?
Let a public investment of g be made in year t. The rate of return on a
private investment made in year t+1 which generates bene…ts in year t+2 is
r(g), with r0 > 0. To analyze the e¤ects of the public investment we use the
following terminology. The person born in year t is the mother, the person
born in year t+ 1 is the daughter, and the person born in year t + 2 is the
granddaughter. We ask whether, starting from a steady state without public
investment, the mother can gain from an increase in the rate of return her
daughter will earn.




¤=(1+ r(0))] = U(0;0;0): (11)
Consider …rst a costless investment that increases by r0dg the rate of
return the daughter earns on the bequest she gives the granddaughter. The







0 ´ ¢: (12)











. The value of this ex-
pression is necessarily positive. This leads to
Proposition 2 A public investment which produces a substitute to a private
good may reduce the mother’s utility. But a (costless) public investment in
infrastructure necessarily bene…ts the mother.
Now suppose the investment is costly, reducing the mother’s endowment.




























Taking the derivative with respect to g gives the …rst-order condition
B
[1+ r(g)]2r0(g) = 1: (16)
We saw from equation (6) that @z2=@z1 = 1+r. Making this substitution in
(14) and comparing to (15) shows that the conditions for maximizing steady-
state consumption and for maximizing the mother’s welfare di¤er. We have:
Proposition 3 A mother will invest too little in (costly) infrastructure.
7 Conclusion
Public …nance has considered important di¤erences between goods provided
by government and goods owned by individuals: governmentally provided
goods are often public goods, each person may be able to consume them at a
price less than marginal social cost, and the level of provision is determined
by collective decisions rather than by markets. This paper highlights an ad-
ditional di¤erence: any one consumer lacks control over who will receive a
governmentally-providedgood. Sometimes this may not matter—a consumer
may be indi¤erent to how much national defense others consume. But when
one person’s consumption opportunities a¤ect another’s, this absence of con-
trol does matter. In particular, we saw that within a family an increase in
a daughter’s endowment may reduce the services she provides her mother.
Such e¤ects can make an individual prefer private investments, whose out-
put she controls, over a more productive public investment, whose output
she does not control.
148 Notation
B Bequest
g Investment in infrastructure, which raises r
r Rate of return on private investment
Ut Utility of person born in year t
xt
2 Consumption of private good by person born in year t in period 2 of her
life
zt
1 Services provided by person born in year t in period 1 of her life
zt
2 Services received by person born in year t in period 2 of her life
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